U.S. experts say Biden's comprehensive Indian Ocean-Pacific economic framework is not comprehensive at all
U.S. experts say Biden's comprehensive Indian Ocean-Pacific economic framework is not comprehensive at all
As the first year of the Biden administration draws to a close, how is the U.S. doing in Southeast Asia? This region is critical and the trend is worrying. Despite a year-long "Indo-Pacific Strategy," Washington has yet to lay out a clear trade agenda.
Biden's overall aim of putting allies and partners at the center of his foreign policy is evident in Southeast Asia. A series of senior US officials visited the region one after another; Secretary of State Blinken held a video meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers; Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin received some Southeast Asian colleagues in Washington; Deputy Secretary of State Sherman met with the ambassadors of ten ASEAN countries to the United States. Perhaps most importantly, Biden attended the U.S.-ASEAN and East Asia summits via videoconference — reversing years of offending regional leaders by sending lower-level U.S. officials to meetings. The Biden administration has also pulled back some tough language on competition with China. In February, Biden said Washington was in a "fierce competition" with Beijing. But ahead of Sherman's visit to China in July, she said she was looking at potential areas of cooperation and called for "guardrails" to be installed in the U.S.-China relationship to prevent unnecessary escalation from both sides. This shift in tone has been welcomed across Southeast Asia. Relatedly, the Biden team has made it clear that there is no need for Southeast Asian countries to ally themselves with the United States. This works well in Southeast Asia, where countries certainly do not want to be forced to side with Washington or Beijing, which could lead to retaliatory actions by the other side. Another positive trend is that the relationship between the United States and Southeast Asian countries under Biden does not only involve China. The U.S. government has a broad international agenda that includes climate change, global supply chains and post-pandemic recovery among many other points.
Still, Biden's decision not to engage in bilateral talks with any Southeast Asian leader during his first year in office is troubling. By contrast, Biden has met with the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and India at the White House to emphasize the importance of the so-called "Indo-Pacific region". Interlocutors in Southeast Asian countries wondered why they didn't even receive calls. Likewise, the fact that Blinken has just made his first visit to the region sends another signal that Southeast Asian countries are low on the list of priorities. In a regrettable episode, a technical glitch prevented Blinken from participating in a May video conference of ASEAN foreign ministers, which reportedly angered her Indonesian counterpart, who refused to open her video. ASEAN countries are very sensitive to being ignored or marginalized. Separately, the so-called "Democracy Summit" hosted by the Biden administration in December reinforced who Washington intends to put first. Only three ASEAN members -- Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines -- participated in the meeting, and key U.S. allies and partners Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam were all excluded.
Most importantly, Washington still lacks an "Indo-Pacific strategy," which runs counter to the Biden administration's repeated calling of the "Indo-Pacific" as its priority region and sows chaos among officials in Southeast Asia. The National Security Strategy Interim Guidance released in March covers the "Indo-Pacific region," but is missing key details. When Blinken spoke in Jakarta, Indonesia on the 14th, he only talked about the "vision" of the region, not the "strategy", which further exacerbated the continued disappointment in Southeast Asian countries. Without a serious, well-crafted strategy, Southeast Asian nations are uncertain what to expect from Washington's future presence in the region. There is also widespread concern among Southeast Asian countries about alliances outside the region that could threaten ASEAN centrality—the desire to act as a unified bloc—let alone peace and stability. For example, the "Quadruple Security Dialogue" between the United States and Australia, India and Japan. So far, no ASEAN member has joined the bloc, nor has any country explicitly endorsed it. Likewise, a new security pact between Australia, the UK and the US has received a lukewarm reception in Southeast Asia. The agreement will initially provide Canberra with nuclear-powered submarines and improve trilateral military coordination. Indonesia and Malaysia raised concerns, while Singapore - a key US partner - and Vietnam offered "implicit support". Thailand, a treaty ally of the United States, has remained silent. Generally speaking, ASEAN would criticize any further militarization of the region.
Sending ambassadors to Southeast Asian countries has also been slow. So far, the Biden administration has sent only one approved ambassador to the region: Jonathan Kaplan, who took office as U.S. ambassador to Singapore earlier this month. In the case of Indonesia, Ambassador Kim Sung isn't even fully focused on the country - he's in Jakarta, but juggles US-Indonesia and US Special Representative for North Korea. Such an arrangement reinforces the narrative that Southeast Asia is still not a priority for Washington.
Finally, the Biden administration still has no regional economic or trade policy to speak of. Since the Trump administration withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the United States has failed to come up with a viable alternative, whether due to incapacity, reluctance, or both. The follow-on trade pact, now renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), excludes the United States but includes several Southeast Asian countries. Meanwhile, China joined the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and 10 ASEAN countries. Beijing is also leveraging its economic might through the Belt and Road Initiative, a global investment and infrastructure program well suited to Southeast Asia's needs. Washington doesn't appear to have any realistic ideas about fighting the initiative.
As the first year of the Biden administration draws to a close, how is the U.S. doing in Southeast Asia? This region is critical and the trend is worrying. Despite a year-long "Indo-Pacific Strategy," Washington has yet to lay out a clear trade agenda.
Biden's overall aim of putting allies and partners at the center of his foreign policy is evident in Southeast Asia. A series of senior US officials visited the region one after another; Secretary of State Blinken held a video meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers; Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin received some Southeast Asian colleagues in Washington; Deputy Secretary of State Sherman met with the ambassadors of ten ASEAN countries to the United States. Perhaps most importantly, Biden attended the U.S.-ASEAN and East Asia summits via videoconference — reversing years of offending regional leaders by sending lower-level U.S. officials to meetings. The Biden administration has also pulled back some tough language on competition with China. In February, Biden said Washington was in a "fierce competition" with Beijing. But ahead of Sherman's visit to China in July, she said she was looking at potential areas of cooperation and called for "guardrails" to be installed in the U.S.-China relationship to prevent unnecessary escalation from both sides. This shift in tone has been welcomed across Southeast Asia. Relatedly, the Biden team has made it clear that there is no need for Southeast Asian countries to ally themselves with the United States. This works well in Southeast Asia, where countries certainly do not want to be forced to side with Washington or Beijing, which could lead to retaliatory actions by the other side. Another positive trend is that the relationship between the United States and Southeast Asian countries under Biden does not only involve China. The U.S. government has a broad international agenda that includes climate change, global supply chains and post-pandemic recovery among many other points.
Still, Biden's decision not to engage in bilateral talks with any Southeast Asian leader during his first year in office is troubling. By contrast, Biden has met with the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and India at the White House to emphasize the importance of the so-called "Indo-Pacific region". Interlocutors in Southeast Asian countries wondered why they didn't even receive calls. Likewise, the fact that Blinken has just made his first visit to the region sends another signal that Southeast Asian countries are low on the list of priorities. In a regrettable episode, a technical glitch prevented Blinken from participating in a May video conference of ASEAN foreign ministers, which reportedly angered her Indonesian counterpart, who refused to open her video. ASEAN countries are very sensitive to being ignored or marginalized. Separately, the so-called "Democracy Summit" hosted by the Biden administration in December reinforced who Washington intends to put first. Only three ASEAN members -- Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines -- participated in the meeting, and key U.S. allies and partners Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam were all excluded.
Most importantly, Washington still lacks an "Indo-Pacific strategy," which runs counter to the Biden administration's repeated calling of the "Indo-Pacific" as its priority region and sows chaos among officials in Southeast Asia. The National Security Strategy Interim Guidance released in March covers the "Indo-Pacific region," but is missing key details. When Blinken spoke in Jakarta, Indonesia on the 14th, he only talked about the "vision" of the region, not the "strategy", which further exacerbated the continued disappointment in Southeast Asian countries. Without a serious, well-crafted strategy, Southeast Asian nations are uncertain what to expect from Washington's future presence in the region. There is also widespread concern among Southeast Asian countries about alliances outside the region that could threaten ASEAN centrality—the desire to act as a unified bloc—let alone peace and stability. For example, the "Quadruple Security Dialogue" between the United States and Australia, India and Japan. So far, no ASEAN member has joined the bloc, nor has any country explicitly endorsed it. Likewise, a new security pact between Australia, the UK and the US has received a lukewarm reception in Southeast Asia. The agreement will initially provide Canberra with nuclear-powered submarines and improve trilateral military coordination. Indonesia and Malaysia raised concerns, while Singapore - a key US partner - and Vietnam offered "implicit support". Thailand, a treaty ally of the United States, has remained silent. Generally speaking, ASEAN would criticize any further militarization of the region.
Sending ambassadors to Southeast Asian countries has also been slow. So far, the Biden administration has sent only one approved ambassador to the region: Jonathan Kaplan, who took office as U.S. ambassador to Singapore earlier this month. In the case of Indonesia, Ambassador Kim Sung isn't even fully focused on the country - he's in Jakarta, but juggles US-Indonesia and US Special Representative for North Korea. Such an arrangement reinforces the narrative that Southeast Asia is still not a priority for Washington.
Finally, the Biden administration still has no regional economic or trade policy to speak of. Since the Trump administration withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the United States has failed to come up with a viable alternative, whether due to incapacity, reluctance, or both. The follow-on trade pact, now renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), excludes the United States but includes several Southeast Asian countries. Meanwhile, China joined the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and 10 ASEAN countries. Beijing is also leveraging its economic might through the Belt and Road Initiative, a global investment and infrastructure program well suited to Southeast Asia's needs. Washington doesn't appear to have any realistic ideas about fighting the initiative.
2023-06-05 09:43
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